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Abstract 
A control model of the U.S. dairy sector was constructed to determine 
optimal policy when bovine somatotropin is released. Social welfare defined 
as consumer plus producer surplus minus adjustment and net government costs 
was maximized. Control variables were the milk support price and government 
purchases of cows. Compared to previous simulation research where government 
policy and adoption were modeled exogenously, the results show that policy not 
overly disruptive to the dairy sector is possible. 
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Optimal Agricultural Policy with Biotechnology:
 
Bovine Somatotropin and the Dairy Sector
 
Bovine somatotropin (bST) is a protein produced in the pituitary gland of 
a dairy cow that regulates and stimulates milk production. Through advances 
in genetic engineering, bST can now be manufactured using recombinant DNA 
technology and injected into cows to increase milk yields. This product is 
not yet available on the commercial market, but supplemental bST administered 
to cows has increased milk yields from 10 to 25% in experimental trials across 
the country (Animal Health Institute). While feed intake of dairy cows 
treated with bST also increases, the evidence from these trials indicates an 
increase in feeding efficiency of 5 to 15 percent. Bovine somatotropin is 
currently under regulatory review and is expected to be approved soon by the 
FDA (Fallert). 
Although the magnitude and timing of the shock from introducing 
bovine somatotropin (bST) into the dairy sector is debatable, most believe 
that its introduction will entail necessary adjustments in dairy policy. In a 
USDA study mandated by Congress, Fallert, et al. examined market impacts due 
to bST adoption under four different policy scenarios, using simulation models 
to predict equilibrium price and quantity values for 1989 through 1996. One 
of their major findings was that the impact of bST depends largely on 
adjustments in dairy policy (e. g., the milk support price). Their results 
suggest that if the support price is not lowered after bST is adopted, then 
government purchases of surplus milk will rise significantly. This is 
consistent with Kaiser and Tauer who found that the use of combined flexible 
support prices and voluntary supply controls, defined as cow removals similar 
to the 1986-87 Dairy Termination Program, was a more attractive policy in 
terms of stabilizing government costs and maintaining farm income than either 
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policy alone. Arguing that adoption of bST would be significantly lower than 
the rates used in the research listed above, Schmidt used adoption rates of 20 
to 30 percent to find that cow numbers would drop by less than 6% during a 
comparable simulation period, a much smaller reduction compared to previous 
research results. 
This article reports a model which determines the dynamic adjustments in 
dairy policy that maximizes social welfare upon the availability of bST. A 
discrete dynamic optimization model of the national dairy sector with two 
control variables is constructed and solved for the period 1990 through 2005. 
The first policy control variable is the milk support price level, which may 
be changed annually in response to the effects of bST on the dairy sector. 
The second policy control variable is a supply control program involving 
annual cow removals. Unlike previous research, the adoption rate of bST is 
endogenous in the model, dependent upon the profitability of using bST 
(Thirtle and Ruttan). This model differs from the control model of McGuckin 
and Ghosh since the objective of their model was to minimize government milk 
purchases from a policy target. They employed one control variable, the 
support price for milk, and an exogenous adoption rate. 
Conceptual Framework 
The use of control theory for agricultural policy analysis was presented 
by Burt in 1969. He stated that the most challenging aspect of using control 
theory for policy decisions was choosing an appropriate and meaningful 
criterion function. He suggested using social value measures directly in the 
criterion function, and possibly imposing ancillary constraints to protect 
farmers' income positions. Since then control models in agriculture have been 
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formulated for a number of commodities, including wool (Hincky and Simmons) 
and beef (Rausser and Freebairn). 
Following Burt's suggestions, the model presented here uses social 
welfare as the objective function. Social welfare (SW) is defined as the sum 
of consumer and producer surplus minus sector adjustment costs and the net 
cost of government dairy programs. It is assumed that the government's 
objective is to select a set of dairy policies over time so as to maximize the 
discounted sum of social welfare with respect to the dairy sector. Instead of 
imposing ancillary constraints to protect farmers' income position as Burt 
suggests, this model uses Pindyck's approach and incorporates adjustment costs 
explicitly in the objective function as an augmentation to producers' surplus. 
The general structure of the discrete control model is 
n 
(1)	 Max ~ SW(AX, X, U)
 
t-l
 
s.t. 
( 2)	 AX - f(X, U) 
where: SW is the welfare function, X is a two variable state vector which 
includes the number of cows and the adoption rate, AX is a vector of state 
variable changes, and U is a two variable control vector consisting of cow 
removals and the milk support price level. In the empirical model, components 
of the welfare function, such as the milk demand and supply functions to 
determine the milk price, are treated as constraints, increasing the apparent 
but not the real complexity of the problem. The following discusses the 
components of the social welfare function and sketches how milk supply and 
demand are modeled. 
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Consumer Surplus 
Consumer surplus can be measured under temporal conditions for the cases 
of price certainty or price uncertainty (Just. Heuth. and Schmitz). However, 
milk and many dairy products are highly perishable which suggests that the 
potential to use inventories to benefit from price variability are modest at 
best. Also, milk products comprise a small proportion of the typical 
consumer's budget and hence the disutility associated with price risk is also 
modest (~right and ~illiams). Therefore, temporal consumer surplus is 
measured nonstochastically in the model as the summation of the discounted 
flows of its static measure for each year in the time horizon. Assuming a 
linear consumer demand function for milk, Marshallian consumer surplus (CS) 
for year t is measured as: 
(3) CSt 0.5 (at - Pt ) Qdt • 
where: at is the intercept term for year t, and Pt and Qdt are the 
equilibrium consumer milk price and quantity demanded for year t. 
Producer Surplus and Ad1ustment Cost 
If income is uncertain, then producer welfare should be measured by 
expected utility. Due to the absence of any aggregate estimate of dairy 
producers' utility function, the expected utility method is not used here to 
compute producer surplus. Rather. risk neutrality is assumed and producer 
surplus is measured as the summation of the discounted flow of annual net 
income for each year of the time horizon. 
Producers may also face significant costs of adjusting to new optimal 
output levels over time, since the introduction of bST and the associated 
potential changes in dairy policy may cause dramatic farm sector adjustments. 
Adjustment costs are implicitly included in supply response via the cow number 
and production per cow equations by the use of lagged dependent variables in 
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the estimation of these equations. To explicitly include adjustment costs 
into social welfare, a negative quadratic function of the change in milk price 
is augmented to net income. The quadratic functional form for adjustment 
costs in a deregulatory optimal control model was suggested by Pindyck and 
used by Chang and Stefanou in their control model of the dairy sector. l 
Adding the adjustment term to producer welfare yields the following producer 
surplus (PS) and adjustment cost (ADJ) measure: 
(4) PSt - ADJ t - (Pt - Wt ) QSt - 6 ~Pt2 , 
where: Wt is variable costs per cwt. of milk, QSt is equilibrium milk supply 
in year t, 6 is the adjustment cost parameter, and ~Pt is the change in the 
milk price from the previous year. 
Net Cost of the Dairy Price Support Program 
Under the dairy price support program, the government indirectly supports 
the market price for manufacture grade (Grade B) milk by agreeing to purchase 
unlimited quantities of storable dairy products at specified support 
(purchase) prices. By doing so, the government may maintain the milk price 
above the market price. The dairy products bought by the government are 
stored and then later released by selling them at either full or reduced 
prices, or given away for domestic and foreign food assistance programs. 
Although net monetary costs of the dairy price support program can be 
estimated quite accurately with the use of Commodity Credit Corporation data, 
net monetary costs would overstate the true social cost because it does not 
include the value to society of domestic and foreign donations. 2 While 
government donations undoubtedly have some value to society, they also entail 
distribution costs and costs of displacing commercial products. Hence, 
valuing donations either at zero or at the market price would be 
inappropriate. In this application, it was assumed that domestic and foreign 
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donations have a value of 50% of the government purchase prices for butter, 
cheese, and nonfat dry milk. Using these procedures, the net cost to society 
of the dairy price support program (CDPSP) for year t was modeled as: 
(5) CDPSPt - ~ PSt Qgt, 
where ~ is net monetary costs minus the value of foreign and domestic 
donations per cwt., divided by the support price; PSt is the support price per 
cwt. in year t; and Qgt is quantity of government purchases in year t measured 
in cwts. of raw milk equivalent. 
Net Cost of Voluntary Supply Control Program 
The supply control instrument in the model is a cow removal program. 
When and if implemented, it is assumed that each farmer would submit a bid on 
how much he must receive to dispose of his cows and remain out of dairying 
indefinitely. It is implicitly assumed that the producers (cows) leaving the 
industry are "bribed" by the government to leave and that the value of each 
bribe is equal to the disutility associated with leaving the industry. Hence, 
there is no net benefit to these exiting dairy farmers to be included in 
social welfare. Since payment of this bribe is borne by the government, the 
net cost of this program (CDTP) for year t is equal to: 
(6) CDTPt - Bt Yt CPt' 
where Bt is the national average bid per cwt. in year t determined empirically 
by expected profitability, Yt is average production per cow (in cwts.) in year 
3t, and CPt	 is the number of cows purchased by the government in year t. 
Based on	 the assumptions and methods underlying the calculation of the 
five components of social welfare with equal weighting to each component, the 
total social welfare for year tis: 
(7)	 SWt - [(.5 (at - Pt ) Qdt } + (Pt - Wt ) QSt} - (6 ~Pt2)
 
- (~ SPt Qgt) - {Bt Yt CPt}]
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Adjustment cost is the only dynamic component of this welfare specification. 
The remaining terms are static measures of welfare, discounted and summed. As 
such, if the adjustment cost parameter was zero, the optimal solution would be 
equivalent to the comparative static result that the government immediately 
remove itself from the market to eliminate deadweight loss. 
Milk Supply and Demand 
The supply of milk is determined by the number of cows multiplied by 
production per cow. Being a biological stock, the number of cows in a given 
year is dependent upon the number of cows in the previous year and economic 
decisions to adjust those numbers based upon expected profit per cow. Also, 
the government can reduce the cow herd through cow purchases. Production per 
cow is a function of lagged production per cow. The technology of bST will 
increase production per cow, but increase production costs per cow due to the 
additional feed required and the cost of the compound. The adoption of bST 
will depend upon the profit differential between treated and non-treated cows. 
The consumer demand for milk is a function of milk price, population and 
income. In addition to consumer demand, the government purchases milk via the 
dairy price support program whenever the market price falls below the 
government support price. 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical model is presented in Table 1. The governments' decision 
problem is to choose the level and time path of the support price (SP t ) and 
number of cows to purchase (CPt) that maximizes discounted social welfare 
subject to a set of equations of motion and constraints. The time horizon for 
this problem is from 1990 through 2005. 
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The first expression in brackets following the discounting term in the 
objective function represents consumer surplus (discussed below). The second 
expression is producer surplus, which is equal to net economic profit per cwt. 
Wt ) times total milk supply (Qts ) in cwt. The next expression 
represents sector adjustment costs, where a marginal adjustment cost 
coefficient (6) of $2.5 billion is assumed. 4 The last two expressions in the 
objective function are the social costs of the dairy price support program and 
government cow disposal program, respectively. The net support price cost 
coefficient, ~, was estimated to be 0.85 using a simple average of previous 
years. 
Equation (2.1) in the constraint set is the estimated demand equation 
expressed in price inverse form. To obtain this function, per capita 
commercial disappearance on a cwt. of milk equivalent basis (Qdt/POPt) was 
estimated as a function of the real all milk price per cwt. (Pt/CPl t ), real 
per capita disposable income (INCt/CPl t ), a time trend (Tt ), and a constant 
5term. The time trend was included to capture the effects of other exogenous 
demand determinants. To correct for potential simultaneity bias due to Pt 
being endogenous, a two step estimation procedure similar to that used by La 
France and de Gorter was used. First, an instrument for the all milk price 
was constructed by regressing Pt on the exogenous milk support price per cwt. 
(PSt), a time trend (Tt ), and a constant term. Using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) , this resulted in the following instrumental variable for the all milk 
price6 : 
(8) Pt - 2.9025 + 0.7310 SPt + 0.1050 Tt 
(7.5) (13.9) (4.0) 
R2 - 0.98; DW - 1.3 
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The predicted value (PRATt) from equation (8) was then used in place of the 
actual all milk price in estimating the demand function. This resulted in the 
following equation using OLS: 
(9) Qdt/POPt - 5.6770 - 0.0553 PRAT/CPl t + 0.00007 INCt/CPl t - 0.0256 Tt (8.2)	 (-3.5) (1.7) (-3.1) 
R2 - 0.65; DW - 1.7 
The price and income elasticities of aggregate demand using 1989 values are 
-0.14 and 0.19, respectively, which are consistent with estimates from 
previous research. To calibrate the price inverse demand equation (2.1) in 
Table 1, the intercept was reduced about 3 percent so that demand predicted by 
this equation was equal to its actual value for 1989. 
Constraint (3.1) in Table 1 restricts the market price from being lower 
than a multiple of the support price. Since regional supply and demand vary 
over time, there is no exact relationship between the support price and the 
U.S. average milk price. Thus, constraint (3.1) is based on the following 
regression of the all milk price on the support price: 
(10) Pt - 1.103 SPt (63.0) 
R2 - 0.90; DW - 0.4 
Constraint (4.1) guarantees that if the government is buying milk through the 
dairy price support program, then the relationship between the market and 
support price in constraint (3.1) is	 binding. 
Equation (5.1) is an equilibrium condition for the nation's milk market. 
This condition requires that aggregate milk demand in year t is equal to 
aggregate milk supply (Qts ) minus	 the quantity of milk removed by the 
government through the dairy price	 support program (Qgt) plus net imports 
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(It), which are assumed to be exogenous based upon quotas and set equal its 
recent level of 2.5 billion pounds of milk equivalent. 
Equations (6.1) - (6.3) define milk yield per cow for cows not treated 
with bST (Yt ) , cows treated with bST (BYt ) , and average milk yields for all 
cows (AYt ) , respectively. Milk yield per cow in cwt. was originally estimated 
as a function of milk yield in the previous period, and real profits per cwt. 
«Pt-l - Wt_l)/CPIt_l) lagged one period. It was assumed that dairy farmers 
make adjustments in production per cow (and cow numbers) following a naive 
profit expectations scheme based upon the previous year's profit. The term Wt 
is variable costs less culled cow receipts on a cwt. basis. Variable costs 
include all variable expenses plus general farm overhead, taxes and insurance, 
interest, and capital replacement (Shapouri, et al.). Real profit was deleted 
from the final equation since it was statistically insignificant. The 
estimated equation using OLS is: 
(11) Yt - 1.020 Yt-l 
(254.8) 
R2 - 0.98; DW - 2.1 
This estimated equation is used in (6.1) in Table 1 to represent milk 
yields for cows not treated with bST. To model milk yields for cows treated 
with bST, the estimated equation was multiplied by the assumed percentage 
increase in yields due to bST (1 + BST) , which is modeled in equation (6.2). 
A bST response of 13.5 percent is demonstrated in the results section. 
Finally, equation (6.3) in Table 1 gives average yield per cow which is a 
weighted average of equations (6.1) and (6.2) with the weights being the 
adoption (At) and non adoption (l-At ) rates. 
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Equations (7.1) - (7.3) define real profit per cow for cows not treated 
with bST (ITt), cows treated with bST (BITt), and average profit for all cows 
(AITt ) , respectively. Bovine somatotropin affects profits per cow in two ways. 
First, profits are increased due to a higher milk yield term (i.e., BYt > Yt ). 
Second, since cows require more feed and there is a cost for bST, variable 
costs increase. Fallert, et al. estimated cost for bST of $50 per cow 
annually and their adjustment in variable costs for a 13.5 percent response 
from bST were used for variable costs (BWt ). 
The cow number equation was estimated as a	 function of real profits per 
cow lagged one period, ITt-l - (Pt-l - Wt-l) Yt-l/CPlt-l), and the number of 
cows in the previous period. The estimated linear equation for cow numbers 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) is: 
(12) Ct - 0.974 Ct-l + .000405 TIt-l (97.5)	 (1.9) 
R2 - 0.81; DW - 1.8 
These estimated parameters were used in equation (8.1). To incorporate the 
cow removal program, the number of cows purchased by the government in year t 
(CPt), was subtracted from cow numbers in (8.1). Yet, cow numbers can rebound 
over time due to profitability in the sector. 
Adoption of bST is determined in equations (9.1) and (9.2) by the 
logistic function At - Kt/(l + exp (-a-b*t». This specification incorporates 
the impacts of profitability and interaction that have been debated between 
economists and sociologists since Griliches' seminal work on hybrid corn. The 
term Kt is the ceiling adoption rate that varies as a function of the 
incremental profits from bST. The denominator represents the process of 
learning and approaches the value of one as t increases. 
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A function for Kt was estimated from a published survey of dairy farmers 
who were given hypothetical bST return data and were asked whether they would 
eventually adopt at various prices of bST (Kinnucan, et al.). Subtracting the 
various prices of bST from the net return provided observations on the net 
profitability of bST with the percentage of farmers who would adopt. Fitting 
a linear, quadratic, and linear no-intercept functions to the data indicated 
that the linear no-intercept function provided the best fit: 
(13) Kt - .01074(BTIt - TIt) (11.71) R2 _ 0.90; DW - 0.94 
where (BTIt - TIt) is the incremental profit per cow from the use of bST. 
Although Kt specifies the final adoption of bST, that adoption will 
increase over time. Unfortunately, Kinnucan et al. did not ask farmers how 
soon they would adopt. A four year adoption curve of 5.4%, 15.3%, 39.7% and 
79.0% from a separate published survey was used to estimate the a and b 
parameters of the logistic equation: 
-4.38 + 1.39t
 
(-16.67) (14.44)
 R2 _ 0.99; DW - 2.07 
assuming that the eventual adoption would be complete (K-l) (Lesser et al.). 
Aggregate milk supply in equation (10.1) is the product of average milk 
yield per cow (AYt ) and number of milk cows (Ct ), where historically 1.5 
percent of production is lost due to leakages such as on-farm use of milk. 
Equations (11.1) and (12.1) define the purchase price per cow (Bt ) that 
the government pays to remove cows from production. Since there were 
inadequate data available to estimate the cow purchase price, equation (11.1) 
was constructed assuming that the price per cow should be based on farmers' 
present profitability minus a cow slaughter market value of $500. It was 
assumed that the cow purchase program would require participants to stay out 
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of dairy farming for five years. Equation (11.1) combines these assumptions 
so that Bt is equal to profits per cow minus $500, with the result multiplied 
by five to reflect the five year duration of the program but discounted to the 
first year. Constraint (12.1) restricts Bt to not be less than $2,304 
increased annually by the CPI, which was the average cow purchase price under 
the 1986 cow removal program. 
Initial values for all exogenous and predetermined variables were set 
equal to their beginning 1990 levels. The CPI was assumed to increase at a 
rate of 4 percent a year and a nominal discount rate of 7 percent was used. 
Costs per cow were increased 3 percent a year starting at it's past three year 
average of $1,590. A population increase of 1 percent a year was assumed 
given recent growth. The problem was solved using GAMS/MINOS non-linear 
programming software (Brooke et a1). 
Results 
Three scenarios are reported: (1) a base line scenario which assumes 
that bST is not available and government cannot implement a cow buyout, (2) 
bST availability with a yield increase of 13.5% and no cow buyout programs, 
and (3) 13.5% bST and a cow buyout. 
The addition of bST in scenario 2 increases welfare from that of scenario 
1 (Table 2). However, the introduction of bST shocks the dairy sector so that 
welfare reductions to producers occur, especially during a transitional period 
as profits are lower. This can be observed from Figure 1 where profits from 
bST with no cow buyout are negative during most of the 1990s. Discounted 
consumer surplus increases $21.32 billion with bST due to lower milk prices 
and greater milk consumption so that the net benefits to society increase even 
with producer surplus net of adjustment costs decreasing $16.56 billion and 
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government costs increasing $.63 billion. Removing cows in scenario 3 
increases total welfare relative to scenario 2, with producers gaining over 
$6.50 billion, consumers losing less than $5.91 billion. but government costs 
significantly lower ($.64 billion). 
If bST is not made available then the nominal price of milk slowly 
increases to $16.06 (Figure 2). If bST is released in 1991 then the milk 
price decreases slightly to a low of $10.94 in 1992 but increases each year 
thereafter, reaching $15.01 by the year 2005. In contrast, if the government 
buys cows optimally then the milk price does not decrease much with bST and 
prices in every year are greater than or equal to the price in the comparable 
scenario without cow purchases. 
Milk consumption is inversely related to the milk price, with the demand 
function shifting each year. With the no bST scenario milk consumption 
steadily increases as population and income increases and as the real milk 
price decreases. A 13.5% bST shock with no cow purchases increases milk 
consumption by 2 billion lbs. in 2000 as compared to no bST. However. if cows 
are optimally purchased then the increase in milk consumption is only slightly 
greater than consumption without bST. 
The support price is binding for the first years under all scenarios 
(Table 3). Without bST, annual eee purchases are 6.55 billion Ibs. in 1991 
but decrease each year to zero by 1997 (Figure 3). With bST and no cow 
buyouts the support price first decreases but then increases through the 
adoption of bST, with eee purchases increasing only slightly during the mid 
1990s. It is interesting that the support price increases while these 
purchases occur, but the purpose is to keep producers' profits from being even 
more negative than what they are during the early 1990s (Figure 1). With cow 
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buyouts, CCC purchases are negligible during the bST simulation period because 
cow removals are used to control the milk supply. 
The adoption of bST is illustrated in Figure 4. With no cow buyout 
program the additional real profits per cow from bST fall during the early 
1990s, slowing the adoption rate. With a cow buyout program, dairy farm 
profitability is restored, allowing greater additional profits from the use of 
bST. The adoption of bST is enhanced; by the year 1995 the adoption rate is 
72 percent rather than only 50 percent without government cow buyouts. In 
both cases the ceiling adoption rate is about 90 percent with bST incremental 
real profits of slightly more than $80. These adoption rates are lower than 
those that have typically been used in previous bST studies, and supports the 
contention of Schmidt that bST adoption will be slow and incomplete. 
Cows numbers decrease over time under all scenarios (Figure 5). The 
reduction partly reflects the long term downward trend in cow numbers that was 
captured in the econometric estimation of the cow number equation. When 
production per cow increases fewer cows are required to produce a given 
quantity of milk. The slower downward trend in cow numbers under scenario 1 
is due to higher profits without bST. Total milk production is shown in 
Figure 6. 
Cow purchases by the government in scenario 3 significantly reduce milk 
cow numbers in the initial year (1990) and then in 1992, 1993 and 1994. With 
bST 390,000 cows should be purchased in 1990 at an average price of $2,396, 
and an additional 90,000 cows are purchased during 1992 and 1993, as bST is 
adopted starting 1991 (Table 3). The cow buyout price in all years is 
determined by the minimum price constraint (eq. 12.1). After the last cow 
purchase in 1993, the CCC purchases a small amount of milk during 1994 through 
1996 to control milk supplies. 
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Average profits per cow arc adversely affected by bST, especially during 
the adoption period. With no cow purchases, profits are negative during the 
adoption and adjustment period (Figure 1). With cow purchases, profits per 
cow are slowly restored to the levels without bST. Milk production per cow 
increases over time but is significantly enhanced with bST. 
Technology rents typically accrue to those who adopt a new technology 
first. This is illustrated in Figure 7 where the profit per cow of adopters 
is always higher than the profit per cow of non-adopters. Also demonstrated 
is the fact that early bST adopters earn larger profits in the initial years 
than what they would have earned if bST was not made available. Those greater 
profits occurred for 3 years beginning in 1991. Beginning in 1995 a 
sufficient number of dairy farmers would have adopted bST, increasing milk 
production and lowering the milk price, that profits per cow would have been 
greater without the availability of bST than availability and adoption of bST. 
However, since profits per cow would be even lower with the availability but 
non-adoption of bST, adopting farmers would continue to use bST. 
The bST technology shock to the sector occurs during the early 90s as bST 
is adopted but adjustment occurs during the entire decade, requiring 
government involvement in the sector through milk purchases and cow removals. 
That adjustment is completed by the next century when government involvement 
in the sector is negligible, implying the government could remove itself from 
the market. However, this is a deterministic, not a stochastic model, and the 
probability of another shock similar to bST may suggest continued government 
involvement in the dairy sector. 
The movement towards a long-run equilibrium is suggested by the values of 
variables in the year 2005. In all scenarios the milk price is from $15.00 to 
$16.00 by the year 2005, although slightly lower under bST. Total production 
17
 
also appears to have reached a long-run path by 2005, with an increase from 
the use of bST. Profits per cow with and without the availability (but 
adoption) of bST are almost identical, suggesting a continued long-run 
convergence. This implies that bST and policy shocks have essentially worked 
their way through the dairy sector by 2005, producing only a slight long-run 
shift in the supply curve as demonstrated by Magrath and Tauer. 
One of the most interesting results of this model is the divergence in 
values of key variables from previous simulation models that have treated 
government policy as exogenous. It is interesting to note that comparable 
simulation models have predicted much larger decreases in support and milk 
prices, as well as farm profitability. Kaiser and Tauer reported that the 
support price, milk price, and farm profitability would fall as low as $8.10 
per cwt., $8.87 per cwt, and negative $9.52 per cow under 8% bST with 
comparable support price adjustments and cow buyouts. Moreover, buyouts of 
cows would total over 1.1 million cows between 1992 and 2000, well over the 
number indicated by this model for comparable years. In a similar scenario 
Fallert et al. found the support price falling to $8.60 per cwt. from 1992 
through 1996 with cow numbers falling 12 percent by 1996. 
While some of this divergence in results is undoubtedly due to different 
model specifications, another explanation for this difference is the fact that 
our model assumes that government responds optimally to maximize social 
welfare. An important implication is that if government behaved optimally in 
an economic sense, then the disruption associated with the restructuring of 
the dairy sector would be substantially lower than previous simulation models 
have indicated. 
The control model results of McGuckin and Ghosh more closely follow the 
results reported here than do the simulation studies results, but significant 
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differences exist. Because their objective was to minimize government milk 
purchases from a target, while the objective here was to maximize social 
welfare, their milk support price tracked lower when bST was released. Their 
government purchases of milk were also greater, but they used exogenous 
adoption rates more rapid than the endogenous adoption rates generated here. 
Summary and Conclusions 
A discrete control model of the U.S. dairy sector was constructed to 
demonstrate how optimal policy can be determined to maximize social welfare as 
bST is adopted. Social welfare was measured as consumer and producer surplus 
minus adjustment and net government costs. The control variables were the 
milk support price and government purchases (removals) of dairy cows. The 
annual adoption of bST was determined endogenously, based upon the net 
profitability of adopting bST and learning, represented by time. 
Empirical results indicate that an optimal support price path can be 
determined that maximizes social welfare which is not overly disruptive to the 
dairy industry. Since dairy producers appear to respond slowly to profit 
decreases, a government cow removal program enhances social welfare with some 
shift of welfare from consumers to producers. The results clearly show that 
dairy policy similar to that authorized under the 1985 Farm Bill can be 
constructed to handle the shock of bST technology. Compared to previous 
simulation results where government policy and adoption were exogenous, the 
results here show that decreases in milk prices and farm profits are not as 
severe. 
All of these results were obtained from a deterministic control model. 
As such, the support price mechanism was only used during an adjustment period 
and then was non-effective, in order to eliminate dead weight loss. However, 
19 
one stated purpose of the support price mechanism is to provide a safety net 
for producers in case of stochastic shocks to the dairy sector. This 
rationale of the support price program needs to be explored by the use of a 
stochastic control model. 
20 
Footnotes 
1.	 Using price rather than cow numbers as the determinant of adjustment 
costs acknowledges that inputs in addition to cow numbers would be 
adjusted by farmers when milk price changes. The use of a sYmmetric cost 
adjustment implies that the same inefficiency can be caused by either a 
price increase or decrease as farmers search for new output levels. The 
adjustment cost parameter may also be interpreted as the inclusion of 
social and regional adjustment costs precipitated by a change in milk 
price. 
2.	 Net monetary cost is equal to gross program outlays less gross program 
receipts. The gross outlays include total purchases, storage and 
handling, transportation, processing and packaging, and domestic and 
foreign donations. The monetary receipts consist of proceeds from the 
sale of products either at market prices or reduced prices. 
3.	 The cost of the cow disposal program was modeled as being borne solely by 
the government, although remaining producers could be required to pay 
some or all of the program costs. In fact, this could be incorporated as 
a control variable. Shifting the cost to producers would simply shift 
government cost to producers' cost in the welfare function, but would 
indirectly affect producer surplus via supply since supply is a function 
of profits. 
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4.	 Unfortunately, previous empirical estimates of adjustment costs have 
employed either a primal or dual approach with technology modeled as a 
trend variable, providing estimates not consistent or compatible with our 
model formulation (Howard and Schumway). Moreover, empirical values of 
adjustment costs are not available, only the empirical impacts. 
Consequently, a marginal adjustment cost coefficient (0) of $2.5 billion 
for the quadratic adjustment equation was chosen after experimenting with 
values of 1.0, 2.5, 5.0 and 7.5. The $1.0 billion value seemed to 
provide little penalty to changes in price and the $5.0 billion and $7.5 
billion values produced only slightly different results from 2.5 billion. 
5.	 All data used in the econometric estimation of equations are national 
time series data for the period 1972 through 1989. All prices and costs 
are deflated by the consumer price index (1989 - 1.0). The all milk 
price is the average price received by dairy farmers from fluid and 
manufactured product processors. Since fluid processors pay more than 
manufactured processors for farm milk, the all milk price is a weighted 
average with the weights based on fluid and manufactured utilization 
rates in the market. 
6.	 For all the estimated equations that follow, the numbers in parentheses 
are t-va1ues, R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination, DW is the 
Durbin-Watson statistic. 
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Table 1. The Empirical Dynamic Optimization Model of the Dairy Sector. 
n 
(1.0) Max: W - ~ [1/(1 + i)t] [(.5(Qt - Pt ) Qdt } + {(Pt - Wt ) QtS 
t-l 
- 6 ~Pt2} - {~ PSt Qgt} - {Bt AYt CPt}] 
s.t.: 
(2.1) Pt - Qt - 18.180 CPItQdt/POPt 
(3.1) Pt ~ 1.103 8Pt 
(4.1) 0 ~ (1.103 8Pt - Pt)Qgt 
(5.1) Qdt - QSt - Qgt + It 
(6.1) Yt - 1.02 Yt-l 
(6.2) BYt - Yt(l + BST) 
(6.3) AYt - (1 - At)Yt + AtBYt 
(7.1) TIt - (Pt - Wt)Yt/CPI t 
(7.2) BTIt - (Pt - BWt)BYt/CPI t 
(7.3) Ant - (1 - At)TIt + AtBTIt 
(8.1) Ct - 0.974 Ct -1 + 0.000405 Ant-l - CPt 
(9.1) At - 0.01074(BTIt - TIt)/(l + exp(4.38 - 1.39 Tt » 
(10.1) QSt - 0.985 AYt Ct 
(11.1) Bt - (Ant(l - (1 + i)-5)/i - 500) * CPI t 
(12.1) Bt ~ 2304 * CPI t 
where: 
Qt - intercept of the aggregate demand function year t 
(Qt - CPI t (100.3 - 0.473 Tt + 0.00127 INCt/CPI t »; 
CPI t - consumer price index for all items year t (1989 - 1.0) with a 4% annual increase; 
Tt - time trend year t (1990 - 19, 1991 - 20, ... ); 
INCt disposable per capita income year t ($) with a 5% annual increase, INC1990 = $15,951; 
Pt - equilibrium all milk price ($/cwt.) year t; 
Qdt = equilibrium milk demand (cwt. of milk equivalent) year t; 
W - variable costs per cwt. for cows not treated with bST less culled cow income per cwt.t 
year t, W1990 - $11.29; 
QSt - aggregate milk supply (cwt.) year t; 
6 - marginal cost of adjustment (set at 2.5); 
~Pt - change in the equilibrium all milk price from previous year; 
~ - average net social cost of price support program per cwt. divided by average milk 
support price per cwt. (~was estimated to be 0.85 with data from 1977 . 1987); 
SPt - milk support price per cwt. year t (PS1990 - $10.10); 
Qgt - government purchases of milk equivalent in cwt. in year t under the price support 
program; 
Bt bid price per cwt. for cow removal program year t;
 
AYt average milk production per cow in cwts. year t;
 
CPt number of cows purchased by government cow removal program in year t;
 
.	 POPt civilian population in millions year t with an annual increase of 1%, POP1990 - 250; 
It net imports of dairy products (cwt. of milk equivalent); 
• Y milk production per cow (in cwts.) for cows not treated with bST in year t,t 
Y1989 - 142.44; 
BYt - milk production per cow (in cwts.) for cows treated with bST in year t; 
BST percentage increase in production per cow due to bST; 
AYt average milk production per cow (in cwts.) for all cows in year t; 
At - percent of cows treated with bST in year t; 
TIt real profit per cow not treated with bST in year t; 
BTI t real profit per cow treated with bST in year t; 
BW t - variable costs per cwt. for cows treated with bST less culled cow income per cwt. in 
year t; 
average real profit per cow for all cows in year t; 
number of cows in millions in year t. C1989 - 10.127;
 
interest rate (set at .07);
 
All milk quantities are listed in units of cwt. for exposition purposes. The model was 
solved in milk quantity units of 10 million pounds to avoid scaling problems. 
Table 2: Discounted Surplus Values (Billions of Dollars). 
No BST BST (13.5%) BST (13.5%) 
No Cow Buyout No Cow Buyout Cow Buyout 
Consumer 
Surplus 935.80 957.12 951. 21 
Producer 
Surplus 24.10 5.95 12.17 
Adjustment 
Cost 3.65 2.06 1. 78 
Net Government 
Cost 2.01 2.63 1. 99 
Net 
Surplus 954.24 958.38 959.61 
Table 3: Control Variables - Support Price ($/cwt.) and Government Cow Purchases 
in Parentheses (Millions of Cows). 
Year 
1990
 
1991
 
1992
 
1993
 
1994
 
1995
 
1996
 
1997
 
1998
 
1999
 
2000
 
2001
 
2002
 
2003
 
2004
 
2005
 
No BST
 
No Cow Buyout
 
10.10 
10.43 
10.82 
11.24 
11. 70
 
12.18 
12.66 
10.82 
10.43 
13.83 
10.64 
14.10 
14.24 
14.38 
14.19 
14.56 
BST (13.5%)
 
No Cow Buyout
 
10.10 
9.97 
9.92 
9.94 
10.04 
10.22 
10.49 
10.83 
11.23 
11.68 
12.15 
12.55 
12.88 
12.96 
9.96 
6.58 
BST (13.5%)
 
Cow Buyout
 
10.10(.39) 
10.17 
10.28 (.06) 
10.40( .03) 
10.56 
10.79 
11.09 
9.89 
11.92 
12.30 
12.62 
12.90 
13.13 
10.18 
8.75 
9.99 
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Table A.1. Data used in the Model. 
Consumer Per Capita 
All Milk Net CCC Commercial Cow Price Disposable Profit Civilian Milk Support Variable 
Price Removals Demand Numbers Index Income Per Cow Population Per Cow Price Costs 
Year ($/cwt) (bil 1bs) (bil 1bs) (1,000) (1989=1) ($) ($/cow) (mil) (cwt) ($/cwt) ($/cwt) 
1972 6.07 5.35 112.90 11,700 0.34 4,000 192.87 208.10 102.59 4.93 4.19 
1973 7.14 2.19 112.60 11,413 0.36 4,481 192.26 211.50 101.19 5.34 5.24 
1974 8.33 1.35 113.10 11,230 0.40 4,855 158.51 213.30 102.93 6.57 6.79 
1975 8.75 2.04 113.80 11,139 0.43 5,291 178.19 210.70 103.60 7.36 7.03 
1976 9.66 1.24 116.30 11,032 0.46 5,744 262.55 216.70 108.94 8.16 7.25 
1977 9.72 6.08 116.10 10,945 0.49 6,262 291.36 220.50 112.06 9.00 7.12 
1978 10.60 2.74 118.80 10,803 0.53 6,968 386.76 223.50 112.43 9.43 7.16 
1979 12.00 2.12 120.10 10,734 0.59 7,682 432.10 224.60 114.92 10.61 8.24 
1980 13.00 8.80 119.00 10,799 0.66 8,422 401.92 229.20 118.91 12.33 9.62 
1981 13.80 12.86 120.30 10,898 0.73 9,247 430.06 228.20 121.83 13.39 10.27 
1982 13.61 14.28 122.10 11,011 0.78 9,732 403.64 229.70 123.06 13.10 10.33 
1983 13.58 16.81 122.50 11,098 0.80 10,339 339.58 234.70 125.77 12.98 10.88 
1984 13.46 8.64 126.90 10,833 0.84 11,257 291.13 234.40 124.95 12.60 11.13 
1985 12.75 13.17 130.60 10,981 0.87 11,872 199.27 236.15 130.24 11. 97 11.22 
1986 12.50 10.60 133.50 10,773 0.88 12,508 211.23 238.30 132.85 11. 60 10.91 
1987 12.54 6.70 135.60 10,327 0.92 13,048 315.07 240.50 138.19 11.29 10.26 
1988 12.24 8.86 137.30 10,262 0.95 13,699 122.72 243.20 141.06 10.60 11.37 
1989 13.50 9.00 136.70 10,127 1.00 15,191 172 .35 249.00 142.44 10.74 12.29 
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